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Reflection on G. C. Goddu’s paper on this CD, as well as on Freeman’s commentary on 
it, suggests the following five desiderata for a definition of argument, in the sense of a 
premise-conclusion complex: 
Ontological status: Arguments in the sense of premise-conclusion complexes are 
better construed as abstract objects than as acts. Although arguing for a position by giving 
supporting reasons is an act, its content can be the content of other acts, such as 
collaborative inquiry or deliberation (i.e. co-construction), explanation of one’s reasons 
for holding a position, and solo reasoning. Since premise-conclusion complexes have 
properties of theoretical interest apart from their embedding in a communicative or 
mental act, we should define what it is to be such a complex independently of any such 
embedding. Hence a premise-conclusion complex is not a type of discourse, contrary to 
my claim in (Hitchcock, 2007). 
 Conditions of actualization: Accidental concatenations of speech acts and illatives 
should not count as expressions of a premise-conclusion complex. A simple premise-
conclusion complex is actualized only when it is the content of a complex illocutionary or 
mental act in which an individual or group infers the conclusion from the premises. And 
so on for complex premise-conclusion structures. We need a clear account of the relation 
of inferring. 
 Components: The components of premise-conclusion complexes should be 
described in such a way as to correspond to the way such complexes are actualized in 
discourse and in thinking. In particular, there needs to be room for (1) suppositional 
reasoning, of various kinds, with a distinction between asserted and supposed premises; 
(2) all the types of speech acts introduced by an inferential ‘therefore’ or its equivalent; 
(3) modal qualifiers of the assertion of premises and the drawing of conclusions; and (4) 
mention of defeaters, counters to defeaters, and so on. 
 Separation: So-called divergent arguments should be treated as separate 
arguments, one for each conclusion drawn. Similarly, independent arguments for a single 
conclusion should be treated as separate arguments; for example, the five ways in which 
Thomas Aquinas argues for the existence of God (Summa Theologica I.Q2.A3) are five 
arguments, not one complex argument. 
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Computational implementation: The definition of a premise-conclusion complex 
should lend itself to computational implementation, for example in an argument 
interchange format like that being developed in the field of artificial intelligence 
(Chesñevar, McGinnis, Modgil, Rahwan, Reed, Simari, South, Vreeswijk and Willmott 
2006). 
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